结论

[1] 关于更早期的回顾，参见G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy,” in The State and American Foreign Economic Policy, ed. G. John Ikenberry and David A. Lake (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 1–14。

[2] Charles Poor Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 322; David A. Lake, “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1993): 459. 参见G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Rafael Reuveny and William R. Thompson, Growth, Trade, and Systemic Leadership (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); John Ravenhill, “US Economic Relations with East Asia: From Hegemony to Complex Interdependence?,” in Bush and Asia: America’s Evolving Relations with East Asia, ed. Mark Beeson (London: Routledge, 2006), 43–45。

[3] Stephan Haggard, “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,” International Organization 42, no. 1 (1988): 91–119; Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East–West Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Hugo Meijer, Trading with the Enemy: The Making of US Export Control Policy Toward the People’s Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[4] Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); James Ashley Morrison, “Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization,” International Organization 66, no. 3 (2012): 395–428.

[5] 更多示例参见Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 103–58; Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 75–120; Llewelyn Hughes, Globalizing Oil: Firms and Oil Market Governance in France, Japan, and the United States (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 2014), 149–97; Margaret E. Peters, “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States,” International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014): 811–44; In Song Kim, “Political Cleavages Within Industry: Firm Level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization,” American Political Science Review 111 (2017): 1–20。

[6] 例如，参见I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005)。

[7] Joseph A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 72–192.

[8] Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 69.

[9] Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 182. 参见Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 140–41。

[10] William R. Thompson, “Long Waves, Technological Innovation, and Relative Decline,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990): 201–33; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996).

[11] Modelski and Thompson, Leading Sectors and World Powers, 70–71.

[12] Daniel Drezner, “State Structure, Technological Leadership and the Maintenance of Hegemony,” Review of International Studies 27, no. 1 (2001): 3–25; Espen Moe, “Mancur Olson and Structural Economic Change: Vested Interests and the Industrial Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” Review of International Political Economy 16, no. 2 ( June 26, 2009): 202–30; Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in the Post-Industrial Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 36–40.其他学者指出了创新在支持国家实力上的重要性。参见Mark Zachary Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)。

[13] Reuveny and Thompson, Growth, Trade, and Systemic Leadership, 13.

[14] William R. Thompson, “Systemic Leadership, Evolutionary Processes, and International Relations Theory: The Unipolarity Question,” International Studies Review 8, no. 1 (2006): 4; Tellis et al., Measuring National Power in the Post-Industrial Age, 40.

[15] ICT行业通常被定义为包括ICT制造商和ICT服务提供商（包括软件、电信、数据处理和托管以及计算机系统设计公司）。参见Brandon Shackelford and John Jankowski, “Information and Communications Technology Industries Account for $133 Billion of Business R&D Performance in the United States in 2013,” National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, April 2016, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsf16309/nsf16309.pdf。

[16] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),“Population,” OECD. Stat, March 23, 2016, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=POP_FIVE_HIST.

[17] European Commission, “The 2016 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard,” Economics of Industrial Research and Innovation, accessed March 13, 2017, http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/scoreboard16.html.

[18] 四个国家及地区包括：芬兰、以色列、韩国和中国台湾。参见Shackelford and Jankowski, “Information and Communications Technology Industries Account for $133 Billion of Business R&D Performance in the United States in 2013”。

[19] Times Higher Education, “World University Rankings 2014–2015,” 2014, Times Higher Education, www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2014-15/world-ranking.

[20] Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

[21] David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 47–50.

[22] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1987), 151; François Crouzet, The Victorian Economy (London: Methuen, 1982), 4–5.

[23] Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun, and John Van Reenen, “Americans Do IT Better: US Multinationals and the Productivity Miracle,” The American Economic Review 102, no. 1 (2012): 167–201.

[24] Barry Jaruzelski, Volker Staack, and Aritomo Shinozaki, “Software-as-a-Catalyst,” Strategy+Business, October 25, 2016, www.strategy-business.com/feature/Software-as-a-Catalyst?gko=7a1ae.

[25] Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[26] Helen Milner and David B. Yoffie, “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands,” International Organization 43, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 244; Dennis C. Mueller, “First-Mover Advantages and Path Dependence,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 15, no. 6 (October 1997): 827–50.

[27] 本段借鉴Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Eco- nomic Progress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 88, 117–19。

[28] 接下来的四句话借鉴Johann Peter Murmann and Ralph Landau,“On the Making of Competitive Advantage: The Development of the Chemical Industry in Britain and Germany Since 1850,” in Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth: Insights from the Chemical Industry, ed. Ashish Arora, Ralph Landau, and Nathan Rosenberg (New York: Wiley, 1998), 31–34。

[29] David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11.

[30] Murmann and Landau, “On the Making of Competitive Advantage,” 36–37.

[31] Robert Friedel and Paul B. Israel, Edison’s Electric Light: The Art of Invention (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 1.

[32] “General Electric Research Lab History,” Edison Tech Center, 2015, www.edisontechcenter.org/GEresearchLab.html.

[33] 接下来的段落借鉴David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, “The U.S. National Innovation System,” in National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 32–40。

[34] Mowery and Rosenberg, “The U.S. National Innovation System,” 48.

[35] Mowery and Rosenberg, “The U.S. National Innovation System,” 34.

[36] Tony Borroz, “Chevrolet’s Mouse That Roared,” Wired, August 22, 2011, www.wired.com/2011/08/chevrolets-mouse-that-roared/.

[37] “G.M. Earnings in ’55 Go Over Billion Mark,” Chicago Tribune, February 3, 1956; Steven Mufson, “Once a Recession Remedy, GM’s Empire Falls,” Washington Post, June 2, 2009; “Fortune 500: 1955 Full List,” Fortune, 2015, http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1955/.

[38] T. A. Heppenheimer, Turbulent Skies: The History of Commercial Aviation (New York: Wiley, 1995), 162–69, 183.

[39] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2012 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2012), chapter 4, 13.

[40] Mowery and Rosenberg, “The U.S. National Innovation System,” 47.

[41] Linda Weiss, America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 78.

[42] 关于这段转变的回顾，参见William Lazonick, Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy? Business Organization and High-Tech Employment in the United States (Kalama- zoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute, 2009), 1–113。

[43] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2012, chapter 4, appendix table 7.

[44] 与其ICT同行相比，苹果公司的研发占比（研发支出除以总收入）传统上相对较低。然而，近年来，苹果公司收入颇高，所以即使是很少的份额也会使苹果在研发经费方面领先世界。

[45] Barry Jaruzelski, Volker Staack, and Aritomo Shinozaki, “2016 Global Innovation 1000 Study,” PwC, accessed March 15, 2017, www.strategyand.pwc.com/innovation1000.请注意，亚马逊有时被归为一般零售商，有时被归为互联网公司。普华永道将其归为软件与互联网公司。

[46] U.S. National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation), chapter 4, appendix table 7.

[47] Weiss, America Inc.?, 97.

[48] Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn, Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS): Doing It Right (College Park: University of Maryland Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise, 2008), 55, www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a494143.pdf.

[49] Jessi Hempel,“DOD Head Ashton Carter Enlists Silicon Valley to Transform the Military,” Wired, November 18, 2015, www.wired.com/2015/11/secretary-of-defense-ashton-carter/.

[50] Weiss, America Inc.?, 64–121.

[51] 2016年，奥巴马政府提议在信息技术采购方面投入864亿美元，其中373亿美元用于国防机构。参见John K. Higgins,“Proposed 2016 Federal Budget Plumps IT Spending by $2B,” E-Commerce Times, March 11, 2015, www.ecommercetimes.com/story/81805.html。

[52] Doug Cameron and Alistair Barr, “Google Snubs Robotics Rivals, Pentagon,” Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/google-snubs-robotics-rivals-pentagon-1425580734.

[53] Olivia Solon, “US Tech Firms Bypassing Pentagon to Protect Deals with China, Strategist Says,” The Guardian, March 2, 2016, www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/02/us-tech-firms-pentagon-national-security-china-deals.

[54] 除非另有说明，以下段落引用David M. Hart, “Political Representation in Concentrated Industries: Revisiting the ‘Olsonian Hypothesis,’” Business and Politics 5, no. 3 (2003): 261–86。

[55] 关于IBM与美国政府关系的概述，参见David Hart, “Red, White, and ‘Big Blue’: IBM and the Business–Government Interface in the United States, 1956–2000,” Enterprise and Society 8, no. 1 (2007): 1–34。

[56] Tony Romm, “Apple Takes Washington,” Politico, August 27, 2015, http://politi.co/1Px6AWo.

[57] 软资金是指对国家政党的捐款。这些捐款首次公开披露是在1991—1992年选举周期中，并在2002年选举后通过立法禁止。外部支出是指团体或个人独立于候选人委员会且不与候选人委员会协调而进行的政治支出。

[58] 本段引用的数据，参见Center for Responsive Politics, “Interest Groups,” OpenSecrets.org, accessed March 16, 2017，www.opensecrets.org/industries/。请注意，关于政党方面的数据仅基于对候选人和政党的贡献。

[59] 关于高科技行业协会的有用概述，参见David Hart ,“New Economy, Old Politics: The Evolving Role of the High-Technology Industry in Washington, D.C.,” in Governance Amid Bigger, Better Markets, ed. Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), 247–50。

[60] Michael A. Murray, “Defining the Higher Education Lobby,” The Journal of Higher Education 47, no. 1 ( January 1976): 82–83.

[61] Washington Higher Education Secretariat, “About WHES,” accessed February 3, 2016, www.whes.org/index.html.

[62] 本段引用的数据，参见Center for Responsive Politics, “Lobbying Spending Database,” OpenSecrets.org, accessed March 3, 2017, www.opensecrets.org/lobby/。

[63] David M. Hart, “ ‘Business’ Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American National Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 7 (2004): 47–69; Kim, “Political Cleavages Within Industry.”

[64] David Hart,“High-Tech Learns to Play the Washington Game, or the Political Education of Bill Gates and Other Nerds,” in Interest Group Politics, ed. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett Loomis, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ, 2002), 293–312.

[65] Lucie Cerna, “The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Coalitions and Policy Outputs in Advanced Industrial Countries,” Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 1 ( January 2009): 144–61.

[66] Shackelford and Jankowski, “Information and Communications Technology Industries Account for $133 Billion of Business R&D Performance in the United States in 2013,” 5.

[67] 例如，参见Philip G. Altbach and Jane Knight, “The Internationalization of Higher Education: Motivations and Realities,” Journal of Studies in International Education 11, no. 3–4 (2007): 292–93。

[68] Lesleyanne Hawthorne, “The Growing Global Demand for Students as Skilled Migrants” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2008), 5–7, www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/intlstudents_0.pdf.

[69] 人们早已认识到资本在自由国际投资体制中对世界主导经济的兴趣，参见U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, 44–78。

[70] Rajneesh Narula and Antonello Zanfei, “Globalization of Innovation: The Role of Multinational Enterprises,” in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 325–26; U.S. National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 4, 61–67.

[71] Narula and Zanfei, “Globalization of Innovation: The Role of Multinational Enterprises,” 328.

[72] Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation; Milner, Resisting Protectionism; Sell, Private Power, Public Law; Peters, “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States.”

[73] “Fortune 500,” Fortune, 2015, http://fortune.com/fortune500/.

[74] 来源于《伊索寓言》，寓意为人们应该满足于现有的东西，切不可贪得无厌。——译者注

[75] Philip Elmer-DeWitt, “Apple as the Goose That Laid the Golden Eggs. Five of Them,” Fortune, November 25, 2013, http://fortune.com/2013/11/25/apple-as-the-goose-that-laid-the-golden-eggs-five-of-them/.

[76] Meijer, Trading with the Enemy, 145–64.

[77] 关于游说信息的价值，参见Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 123。

[78] David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Mark A. Smith, American Business and Political Power: Public Opinion, Elections, and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Sheldon Kamieniecki, Corporate America and Environmental Policy: How Often Does Business Get Its Way? (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 2006); Mark A. Smith, “The Mobilization and Influence of Business Interests,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Jeffrey M. Berry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 451–67.

[79] Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 202–4.

[80] Smith, American Business and Political Power, 8–11.

[81] Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 212.

[82] Larry Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees (New York: Norton, 1984), 135; R. Kenneth Godwin, One Billion Dollars of Influence: The Direct Marketing of Politics (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988), 131–36; Larry Sabato, Paying for Elections: The Campaign Finance Thicket (New York: Priority, 1989), 13.

[83] Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 131.

[84] Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 79.

[85] David C. Kimball et al., “Who Cares about the Lobbying Agenda?” Interest Groups & Advocacy 1, no. 1 (May 2012): 5–25.

[86] 关于认知和框架在塑造外国经济政策偏好中的重要性，参见Raymond Hicks, Helen V. Milner, and Dustin Tingley,“Trade Policy, Economic Interests, and Party Politics in a Developing Country: The Political Economy of CAFTA- DR,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 2014): 106–17。

[87] George J. Borjas, Immigration Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

[88] Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, “Attitudes Toward Highly Skilled and Low- Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 61.

[89] Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Theodore H. Moran, and Lindsay Oldenski, Outward Foreign Direct Investment and US Exports, Jobs, and R&D: Implications for US Policy (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2013).

[90] Neil Malhotra, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, “Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing Between Prevalence and Conditional Impact,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 2 (April 2013): 391–410; Brenton D. Peterson, Sonal S. Pandya, and David Leblang, “Doctors with Borders: Occupational Licensing as an Implicit Barrier to High Skill Migration,” Public Choice 160, no. 1–2 ( July 2014): 45–63.

[91] Peterson, Pandya, and Leblang, “Doctors with Borders.”

[92] Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 232.

[93] Ken Kollman, Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[94] Chase, “Moving Hollywood Abroad: Divided Labor Markets and the New Politics of Trade in Services,” 660; Giovanni Facchini, Anna Maria Mayda, and Prachi Mishra, “Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?” Journal of International Economics 85, no. 1 (September 2011): 114–28.

[95] Laurie P. Milton, “An Identity Perspective on the Propensity of High-Tech Talent to Unionize,” Journal of Labor Research 24, no. 1 (2003): 32; Robbert van het Kaar and Marianne Grünell, “Industrial Relations in the Information and Communications Technology Sector,” Eurofound, August 27, 2001, www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/industrial-relations-in-the-information-and-communications-technology-sector. 参见Lazonick, Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy?, 144–46。

[96] 关于大规模动员的挑战，参见Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 156–57。

[97] Janice Fine and Daniel J. Tichenor, “An Enduring Dilemma: Immigration and Organized Labor in Western Europe and the United States,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration, ed. Marc Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 532–72.

[98] 我在这里遵循Berry的定义。参见Jeffrey M. Berry, The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), 2。

[99] Berry, The New Liberalism; Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 238.虽然这些研究集中在美国政治上，但是公民团体在其他情况下能有效地反对商界。参见Andreas Dür, Patrick Bernhagen, and David Marshall, “Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?” Comparative Political Studies 48, no. 8 (2015): 951–83; Andreas Dür and Gemma Mateo, “Public Opinion and Interest Group Influence: How Citizen Groups Derailed the Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement,” Journal of European Public Policy 21, no. 8 (2014): 1199–1217。

[100] Thomas T. Holyoke, “The Interest Group Effect on Citizen Contact with Congress,” Party Politics 19, no. 6 (November 1, 2013): 937–40.

[101] Kollman, Outside Lobbying, 58–100; Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 127.

[102] John R. Wright, Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions and Influence (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1996).

[103] 关于结合不同自由国际关系理论的实用性，参见Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Law,” in Interdisciplinary Perspec- tives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, ed. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 85. 关于更多自由理论的研究，参见Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53。

[104] David A. Lake, “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review,” The Review of International Organizations 4, no. 3 (September 2009): 225.

[105] Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 129; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 401–2.

[106] 最近的研究强调了国家的国内创新政策如何能够反映国家安全问题。参见Weiss, America Inc.？; Taylor, The Politics of Innovation。

[107] Dong Jung Kim, “Cutting Off Your Nose? A Reigning Power’s Commercial Containment of a Military Challenger” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 2015); Dong Jung Kim,“Trading with the Enemy? The Futility of US Commercial Countermeasures Against the Chinese Challenge,” Pacific Review, November 2, 2016, 1–20.

[108] 关于“冷战”期间这些问题的普遍存在，参见Mastanduno, Economic Containment。

[109] Smith, American Business and Political Power, 9.

[110] Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change, 29–45.

[111] David Nelson and Susan Webb Yackee, “Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change: An Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 2 (2012): 339–53.

[112] Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 575.

[113] 关于测试因果机制的过程追踪的效用，参见Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 205–32。

[114] 如果需要，分析还可以考虑其他因素，例如，相关的签证费、入学是否取决于劳动力市场测试，以及是否允许配偶工作。参见Lucie Cerna, “The EU Blue Card: Preferences, Policies, and Negotiations Between Member States,” Migration Studies 2, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 9–10。