近几十年的创新全球化正在经历前所未有的发展。技术人员和学生流动越来越活跃，跨国公司和研究型大学进行跨境研发投资和合作比以往更多。与此同时，世界上最著名的崛起大国，已经欣然接受了这些发展，致力于凭自身实力成为创新领袖。
然而，这种开放并不意味着无视风险。相反，中国和印度都逐渐提升了对全球创新的热情，并且偶尔会反思这种开放。中国和印度在不同程度上担忧派往海外的人才是否会回归，而且也一直担心外国研发中心吸引国内顶尖人才。在这两种情况下，潜在的风险都是可以理解的，但主流观点认为，开放的潜在好处超过了潜在的风险。
中国和印度以不同的方式接触全球创新。中国政府更具有目的性也更加积极主动，其鼓励海外人才回归并努力吸引外商在研发方面的投资。相比之下，印度的做法似乎更有针对性。虽然印度对“逆向移民”感兴趣，但印度更加适应并且更加依赖“侨民模式”。在这两种情况下，该国都有信心和希望从全球创新中获益。
这些发展为许多国家提出了重要问题，尤其是对世界主导国家和技术领袖而言。在接下来的章节，我将阐述其他影响美国参与全球创新的力量。
[1] Andrew B. Kennedy, “Slouching Tiger, Roaring Dragon: Comparing India and China as Late Innovators,” Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 2 (2016): 1–28. 关于中国和印度在创新方面的发展轨迹的争论，参见Andrew B. Kennedy, “Powerhouses or Pretenders? Debating China’s and India’s Emergence as Technological Powers,” The Pacific Review 28, no. 2 (2015): 281–302。
[2] 为了能更好地理解“创新”这一概念, 参见Jan Fagerberg, “Innovation: A Guide to the Literature,” in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4–9。
[3] “对世界来讲新颖的”技术通常与“对国家来讲新颖的”技术和“对公司来讲新颖的”技术进行比较。参见Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities (Oslo Manual) (Paris: OECD, 1997)。
[4] Fagerberg, “Innovation,” 4–9.
[5] 此外，当给定技术由以模块化方式组合的组件组成时，通常区分两种其他类型的创新。“模块式”创新是指单个组件的变化，而“架构式”创新是以新的方式组合以前存在的组件。参见Dieter Ernst, A New Geography of Knowledge in the Electronics Industry? Asia’s Role in Global Innovation Networks (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2009), 7–12; Richard M. Henderson and Kim B. Clark, “Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms,” Administrative Science Quarterly 35, no. 1 (March 1990): 9–30。
[6] Daniele Archibugi and Simona Iammarino, “The Globalization of Technological Innovation: Definition and Evidence,” Review of International Political Economy 9, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 98–122; Rajneesh Narula and Antonello Zanfei, “Globalization of Innovation: The Role of Multinational Enterprises,” in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 318–45; Dieter Ernst, Innovation Offshoring: Exploring Asia’s Emerging Role in Global Innovation Networks, East-West Center Special Report No. 10 (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, July 2006).
[7] 从这一点来看，这里所采取的方法与以下研究中采用的方法类似：William Lazonick, Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy? Business Organization and High-Tech Employment in the United States (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute, 2009)。
[8] 这并不是说创新只是增加劳动力和资本投入的一个功能。正如关于国家和区域创新体系的文献所表明的那样，资本和劳动力运作的背景非常重要。参见Christopher Freeman, Technology, Policy, and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan (London: Pinter, 1987); Bengt-Åke Lundvall, National Systems of Innovation: Toward a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning (London: Pinter, 1992); Richard R. Nelson, ed., National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Bjørn T. Asheim and Meric S. Gertler, “The Geography of Innovation: Regional Innovation Systems,” in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 291–317。一个有趣的研究方向是探讨全球化如何改变国家创新体系。参见David M. Hart, “Understanding Immigration in a National Systems of Innovation Framework,” Science & Public Policy 34, no. 1 (2007): 45–53。
[9] Paul M. Romer,“Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 5 (1990): S71–S102.
[10] 另外3%是自由职业者。参见National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation), chapter 3, 37。
[11] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 3, 40.
[12] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 5, appendix table 18.
[13] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 5, 76–78.
[14] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 5, 76.
[15] Keith Pavitt, “Innovation Processes,” in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 95; David C. Mowery and Bhaven N. Sampat, “Universities in National Innovation Systems,” in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, ed. Jan Fagerberg, David Mowery, and Richard R. Nelson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 221–24.
[16] Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy Hatton, “International Migration and the Integration of Labor Markets,” in Globalization in Historical Perspective, ed. Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 70.
[17] Harm G. Schröter and Anthony S. Travis, “An Issue of Different Mentalities: National Approaches to the Development of the Chemical Industry in Britain and Germany Before 1914,” in The Chemical Industry in Europe, 1850–1914, ed. Ernst Homburg, Anthony S. Travis, and Harm G. Schröter (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1998), 100.
[18] Petra Moser, Alessandra Voena, and Fabian Waldinger, “German Jewish Émigrés and US Invention,” The American Economic Review 104, no. 10 (2014): 3222–55; Annie Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program That Brought Nazi Scientists to America (New York: Little, Brown, 2014).
[19] “人才流失”一词最初用于描述英国科学家在20世纪60年代初流入美国的情况，但很快该词就用于表示发展中国家的人才流向发达国家。参见Hart, “Understanding Immigration in a National Systems of Innovation Framework,” 46。
[20] Frédéric Docquier, Olivier Lohest, and Abdeslam Marfouk, “Brain Drain in Developing Countries,” The World Bank Economic Review 21, no. 2 ( January 1, 2007): 194.
[21] Cansin Arslan et al., A New Profile of Migrants in the Aftermath of the Recent Economic Crisis, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 160 (2014): 37, www.oecd.org/els/mig/WP160.pdf.
[22] 作者的计算基于Arslan et al., A New Profile of Migrants, 26。
[23] AnnaLee Saxenian, The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
[24] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 3, 103.
[25] Institute for Regional Studies,“Silicon Valley Index 2017,” Silicon Valley Indicators, February 2017, 14, http://jointventure.org/images/stories/pdf/index2017.pdf.
[26] OECD, Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators (Paris: OECD, 2014), 344.
[27] OECD, Education at a Glance 2014, 342.
[28] OECD, Education at a Glance 2014, 350–51.
[29] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 2, 91.
[30] Australian Government Department of Education and Training, “International Students Studying Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) in Australian Higher Education Institutions,” Research Snapshots, October 2015, https://international education.gov.au/research/Research-Snapshots/Documents/STEM%202014.pdf.
[31] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 2, appendix table 43.
[32] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2004 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2004), chapter 2, appendix table 27; National Science Foun- dation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 2, 71.
[33] 第4章详细讨论了在美国进行科学与工程领域学习的中国和印度研究生的数量。
[34] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 5, 81.
[35] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 2, appendix table 33.
[36] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 5, appendix table 16.
[37] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 3, 105.
[38] 第2章用了很大的篇幅对工业界研发的崛起进行了介绍。
[39] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2012 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2012), chapter 4, 15 and 55.
[40] 如前所述，尽管我对学生流动的情况分开对待，但是此处介绍的全球研发的两个类别大致基于Archibugi和Iammarino以前的研究。参见Archibugi and Iammarino, “The Globalization of Technological Innovation”。
[41] Steve Fraser, “The Hollowing Out of America,” The Nation, December 3, 2012, www.thenation.com/article/171563/hollowing-out-america#.
[42] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2014 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2014), chapter 4, 27.
[43] Narula and Zanfei, “Globalization of Innovation,” 326.
[44] 跨国公司特别需要与薄弱的知识产权保护进行抗争。参见Minyuan Zhao, “Conducting R&D in Countries with Weak Intellectual Property Rights Protection,” Management Science 52 (August 2006): 1185–99。
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[46] Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, All Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates, Research and Development Expenditures for 2013,” International Data: Direct Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 2016, www.bea.gov/iTable/index_MNC.cfm.
[47] Andrew B. Kennedy, “Unequal Partners: U.S. Collaboration with China and India in Research and Development,” Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 1 (2017): 63–86.
[48] Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.”“信息”类包括软件发行。2013年还没有软件发行的数据，但前几年里，软件发行在“信息”类海外研发支出中占主导地位。
[49] 对于这两种类型的讨论，参见Narula and Zanfei, “Globalization of Innovation,” 326–29。
[50] 近年来，学者们已经注意到其他类型的海外研发。例如，参见Jian Wang, Lan Xue, and Zheng Liang, “Multinational R&D in China: From Home- Country-Based to Host-Country-Based,” Innovation: Management, Policy & Practice 14, no. 2 ( June 2012): 192–202。
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[53] 注意，没有一个数据库包含创建的所有联盟，尽管这些数据库达成一致意见，即随着时间的推移，联盟数量会有所不同。因此，基于SDC白金数据库的数据应被视为具有启发性而非准确无误。参见Melissa Schilling, “Understanding the Alliance Data,” Strategic Management Journal 30, no. 3 (2009): 233–60。
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[126] Devesh Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 51–54.
[127] Government of India, Passports Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 15 (1967), 1, http://passportindia.gov.in/AppOnlineProject/pdf/passports_act.pdf.
[128] Government of India, Passports Act of 1967, 6.
[129] Government of India, Emigration Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 31 (1983), 15, http://moia.gov.in/writereaddata/pdf/emig_act.pdf.
[130] David Fitzgerald,“Inside the Sending State: The Politics of Mexican Emigration Control,” International Migration Review 40, no. 2 (2006): 262.
[131] 主要的例外是医疗领域，其中引入了一些限制，但有太多漏洞而无法奏效。参见Binod Khadria, “Brain Drain, Brain Gain, India,” in The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, ed. Immanuel Ness (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 743。
[132] J. Singh and V. V. Krishna, “Trends in Brain Drain, Gain and Circulation: Indian Experience of Knowledge Workers,” Science Technology & Society 20, no. 3 (November 1, 2015): 302–6.
[133] Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy, 180–81.
[134] Rajiv Gandhi, “Revamping the Educational System,” Indian National Congress, August 29, 1985, www.inc.in/resources/speeches/345-Revamping-the-Educational-System.
[135] “Vajpayee Calls for Reversing Brain Drain, Cutting Red Tape,” Hindu Business Line, January 4, 2003, www.thehindubusinessline.com/bline/2003/01/04/stories/2003010402410500.htm; “PM for Reverse Brain Drain of Scientists,” Economic Times, January 4, 2011, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-01-04/news/28424740_1_scientists-of-indian-origin-talent-pool-98th-indian-science.
[136] Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy, 165.移民率是某一教育层次群体中移民的人数除以该群体在原籍国的总人数。
[137] 关于之前的三句话，参见Sanjoy Chakravorty, Devesh Kapur, and Nirvikar Singh, The Other One Percent: Indians in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), x, 30, 108。
[138] UNESCO, “Education Data”; Devesh Kapur, “Indian Higher Education,” in American Universities in a Global Market, ed. Charles T. Clotfelter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 326.
[139] Institute for International Education, “International Student Totals by Place of Origin, 2013/14–2014/15,” Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange, 2015, www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/All-Places-of-Origin/2013-15.
[140] National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2016, chapter 2, appendix table 27.
[141] Australian Government Department of Education, “International Student Enrolments by Nationality in 2013,” April 2014, 1, https://internationaleducation.gov.au/research/research-snapshots/pages/default.aspx; UNESCO, “Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students,” UIS.Stat, accessed December 10, 2014, www.uis.unesco.org/EDUCATION/Pages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx.
[142] Rajiv Gandhi, “Keep Pace with Technology,” Indian National Congress, December 19, 1985, www.inc.in/resources/speeches/315-Keep-Pace-with-Technology.
[143] Singh and Krishna, “Trends in Brain Drain,” 308–10.
[144] 2001年，印度推出了示范教育贷款计划，为在印度或国外接受高等教育的学生提供软贷款。然而，该计划并不要求学生返回印度，一直被批评为烦琐且缺乏影响力。参见Asian Development Bank, Counting the Cost: Financing Asian Higher Education for Inclusive Growth (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2012), 16。
[145] Kennedy, “Slouching Tiger, Roaring Dragon,” 71–72.
[146] Chakravorty, Kapur, and Singh, The Other One Percent, 56.
[147] Chakravorty, Kapur, and Singh, The Other One Percent, 56; Vivek Wadhwa, The Immi- grant Exodus: Why America Is Losing the Global Race to Capture Entrepreneurial Talent (Philadelphia: Wharton Digital, 2012); Singh and Krishna, “Trends in Brain Drain,” 310–13.
[148] Michael G. Finn, “Stay Rates of Foreign Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities, 2001” (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, November 2003), 9, http://orise.orau.gov/files/sep/stay-rates-foreign-doctorate-recipients-2001.pdf.
[149] Michael G. Finn,“Stay Rates of Foreign Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities, 2011” (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, January 2014), 7, http:// orise.orau.gov/science-education/difference/stay-rates-impact.aspx.
[150] Fei Qin, “Global Talent, Local Careers: Circular Migration of Top Indian Engineers and Professionals,” Research Policy 44, no. 2 (2015): 405–20.
[151] Khadria, “Brain Drain, Brain Gain, India,” 3.
[152] High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, “The Indian Diaspora” (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 2001), xi, http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm.
[153] 有关印度侨民政策的有价值的概述，参见Daniel Naujoks, Migration, Citizen- ship, and Development: Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 49–65。
[154] Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy, 261–68.
[155] Narendra Modi,“Modi Speaks in San Jose: The Indian Prime Minister in His Own Words,” SiliconValleyOneWorld, September 27, 2015, www.siliconvalleyoneworld.com/2015/09/30/modi-speaks-in-san-jose-the-indian-prime-minister-in-his-own-words/.
[156] Kapur, Diaspora, Development, and Democracy, 106–13.
[157] World Bank Migration and Remittances Team, Migration and Remittances: Recent Devel- opments and Outlook, Migration and Development Brief No. 23 (October 6, 2014): 4, 10, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf.
[158] Ronil Hira, “U.S. Immigration Regulations and India’s Information Technology Industry,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 71, no. 8 (October 2004): 837–54.
[159] 同年，总部设在其他地方的六家外包公司（但也聘请了许多流动印度工人）获得了9 943份H-1B签证。参见Haeyoun Park, “How Out- sourcing Companies Are Gaming the Visa System,” New York Times, November 10, 2015。
[160] Nair Chendakera, “U.S., India Move to Boost Cooperation in R&D,” Electronic Engineering Times, March 27, 2000; Bruce Stokes, “India’s Paradox,” National Journal, April 7, 2007; Amiti Sen, “India to Ask US for More H-1B Visas,” Economic Times, October 19, 2009; Nirupama Rao,“America Needs More High-Skilled Worker Visas,”USAToday,April 14, 2013, www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/04/14/india-trade-technology-column/2075159/.
[161] “India May Drag US to WTO for Hiking H-1B Visa Fee,” Times of India, August 17, 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-may-drag-US-to-WTO-for-hiking-H-1B-visa-fee/articleshow/6325497.cms.
[162] “Obama Assures Modi on Concerns Over H-1B Visa Issue,” Times of India, January 26, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Obama-assures-Modi-on-concerns-over-H-1B-visa-issue/articleshow/46022377.cms.
[163] Ronil Hira, “New Data Show How Firms Like Infosys and Tata Abuse the H-1B Program,” Economic Policy Institute, February 19, 2015, www.epi.org/blog/new-data-infosys-tata-abuse-h-1b-program/.
[164] Arun Janardhanan, “US Move to Lure Science Grads Worries India,” Times of India—Chennai Edition, February 4, 2013.
[165] Former high-ranking Indian official, interviewed by author. February 16, 2017, New Delhi.受访者认为在不考虑签证限制的情况下，想要留在国外的人最终会找到一条路的。
[166] Dinesh C. Sharma, The Long Revolution: The Birth and Growth of India’s IT Industry (Noida: Harper Collins, 2009), 317–18.
[167] “Research and Development,” General Electric, 2017, www.ge.com/in/about-us/research-and-development.
[168] Min Ye, Diasporas and Foreign Direct Investment in China and India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 177–204.
[169] N. Mrinalini, Pradosh Nath, and G. D. Sandhya, “Foreign Direct Investment in R&D in India,” Current Science 105, no. 6 (September 2013): 770–71.
[170] Sujit John and Shilpa Phadnis, “For MNCs, India Still an R&D Hub and It’s Growing,”Times of India, March 2, 2017, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bengaluru/for-mncs-india-still-an-rd-hub-and-its-growing/articleshow/57421665.cms.
[171] Bruche, “The Emergence of China and India as New Competitors in MNCs’ Innovation Networks,” 276.
[172] IBM India Research Lab, Bangalore, interviewed by author, January 13, 2014.受访者希望匿名。
[173] Nirmalya Kumar and Phanish Puranam, India Inside: The Emerging Innovation Challenge to the West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2012), 109–14.
[174] Government of India, “Science, Technology and Innovation Policy,” 15.
[175] Thomson Reuters, SDC Platinum database.
[176] Narendra Modi, “PM’s Address to the Nation from the Ramparts of the Red Fort on the Sixty-Eighth Independence Day,” PMIndia, August 15, 2014, http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-pms-address-in-hindi-to-the-nation-from-the-ramparts-of-the-red-fort-on-the-68th-independence-day/.
[177] Narendra Modi, “Text of PM Shri Narendra Modi’s Address at the 102nd Indian Science Congress,” Narendra Modi, January 3, 2015, www.narendramodi.in/text-of-pm-shri-narendra-modis-address-at-the-102nd-indian-science-congress.
[178] Narendra Modi,“Modi Speaks in San Jose: The Indian Prime Minister in His Own Words,” SiliconValleyOneWorld, September 30, 2015, www.siliconvalleyoneworld.com/2015/09/30/modi-speaks-in-san-jose-the-indian-prime-minister-in-his-own-words/.
[179] 接下来的两句话参见Rafiq Dossani and Martin Kenney, “Creating an Environment for Venture Capital in India,” World Development 30, no. 2 (2002): 243–49。
[180] Samarth Agarwal, interviewed by author, February 16, 2017.阿加瓦尔是2016年成立的印度创业公司Spaceboat的创始人。
[181] “One Year of Startup India: Report Card,” TechCircle, January 16, 2017.
[182] “RBI Eases Norms for Foreign Investment in Startups,” TechCircle, October 21, 2016.