2016年11月，唐纳德·特朗普当选美国总统，打破了美国政治制度的传统智慧。特朗普竞选活动中值得注意的主题是反移民、反全球化和反少数种族，甚至是众议院议长保罗·瑞安所称“教科书式”的种族主义。[35]特朗普的胜利似乎将美国的反移民运动推向了白宫，同时也标志着HTC在政治上面临巨大的失败，因为HTC主要支持希拉里·克林顿。[36]截至2017年5月，特朗普的当选对美国政策制定的全面影响仍不明朗。政府部门的许多空缺职位仍未填补，鉴于特朗普与俄罗斯关系的争议以及其他问题，人们纷纷猜测他将留任多久。即便如此，值得一提的是，在全球创新的政策上，美国的政策制定是否正在转向一个新的阶段？在新阶段里，政府的影响力是否会使社会利益集团，尤其是HTC的影响力不断减小？
基于以下几点原因，这不太可能实现。第一个原因是美国政策在这一领域的最重大变化通常要求白宫与国会合作。事实上，正是出于这个原因，奥巴马政府试图通过立法修改美国的离岸外包和移民政策。反过来，国会需要为强大的利益集团创造大量机会，以阻止不受这些集团欢迎的变革。高科技公司以及更广泛的商业利益集团，已经在近十几年成功地阻止了大多数修改美国离岸外包政策的尝试，即使这些变化得到了白宫的支持。同一时期，公民团体也阻止了多次企图改变美国移民政策的行动。特朗普政府仍然有可能设法通过立法推进其部分议程，特别是在共和党控制国会两院时。然而，大部分忽视HTC集体利益的重大立法是不可能实现的。
当然，政府部门可以单方面采取行动，但这种行动可能会面临限制。正如第3章所介绍的，尽管奥巴马政府确实通过行政行为对技术移民政策做出了一些改变，但是它避免了做出根据法律不能明确提出的更广泛的改变。事实上，奥巴马的改变让Compete America的执行主席大为恼火，称仍然需要许多“行动”和“具体结果”。[37]特朗普政府可以根据更广泛的行政权力概念行动，但是如果这样做，也会面临法律诉讼的威胁。例如，2017年上半年，特朗普对某些穆斯林占多数的国家实施旅行禁令，高科技公司和大学对此都积极支持动用法律手段来反对特朗普的这种行为，这使特朗普政府大受打击。[38]然而，这一争端最终得到解决，这突出表明，政府部门并不拥有随意重塑美国政策的权力，即使试图这样做可能会损害美国的形象。
第二个原因是特朗普政府和HTC之间的关系更复杂，二者之间既有冲突也有合作的可能性。可以肯定的是，双方存在很多冲突，关于旅行禁令的争议就是一个明显的例子。特朗普政府早期改变H-1B签证计划的举措也使技术公司大为失望，特别是暂停加急申请处理并禁止入门级计算机工作被视为“专业性工作”（specialty occupation）。[39]特朗普撤销了奥巴马的一些政策规定，包括H-1B签证获得者配偶的工作授权，以及针对科学、技术、工程和数学领域的毕业生的实习工作许可证。与此同时，媒体报道声称硅谷正在努力“推翻”特朗普，包括通过组建“科技的运动”（Tech for Campaigns）这样的新团体来支持民主党候选人的工作。[40]特朗普与科技行业的冲突非常尖锐，并且在将来有可能升级。
然而，特朗普政府也与HTC进行了对话，他们可以在一些领域进行合作。2017年4月，白宫启动了针对H-1B签证计划的审查，该计划旨在确保签证“授予最熟练或收入最高的请愿受益人”。[41]撰写本书时，这次审查是否会导致立法者或政府为此而立法尚不清楚。但是，审查将有可能产生使HTC大部分成员接受的提案。根据具体细节，许多领先的美国ICT公司可以从更加基于绩效的系统中受益，因为这些公司通常雇用受过更多教育的H-1B签证获得者并支付比其他公司更高的工资。这种制度是否也会使美国大学受益将由具体情况决定。强调技能可以使新毕业生受益，但新的工资门槛或其他要求可能不会对新毕业生有利。相比之下，一个更加基于绩效的系统可能会减少IT外包公司的签证，不仅包括印度公司，还包括从事这项业务的美国公司（例如IBM）。这不仅会影响IT外包公司，也会影响它们的客户，其中很多客户都是美国领先的ICT公司。[42]美国各类公司也可能会担心国外对这些变化的反应，特别是印度。总体来说，美国HTC的一些成员可能会支持一个更基于绩效的系统，而其他成员则抵制这一改变。
税制改革是特朗普政府与美国高科技公司之间可能进行合作的领域。作为候选人，特朗普反对美国就业机会的离岸外包，并威胁称要通过某种边境税的政策来惩罚这种行为。但是，边境税理念在特朗普政府内部引发了争议，并且到目前为止，边境税还没有成为税制改革工作的重点。[43]相反，政府一直专注于激励企业在美国进行投资，特别是通过降低企业收入税率和提供免税期以鼓励跨国公司从国外汇回利润，[44]这些想法自然会吸引一些高科技公司。[45]即便如此，如果政府期望通过免税期来刺激在美国进行新的高科技投资，那么他们会大感失望。大型的ICT公司不受资本约束，汇回的利润更有可能用于减少债务、支付股东股息和进行股票回购。[46]
第三个原因是持久力。虽然特朗普当选标志着美国发展进程中的惊人变化，但是这并没有抹去过去20年来推动美国政策的基本社会利益。在特朗普离开白宫很久之后，高科技利益集团仍将是一股强大的政治力量，它们将继续敦促更大程度的面向全球创新的开放。HTC成功的程度将在很大程度上受到其所面临的抵制的性质的影响。这种抵制在未来可能会更加强大，特别是如果特朗普离任后反移民运动加剧的话。抵制也可能变弱，因为反移民运动可能会随着时间的推移而逐渐萎缩，反对零敲碎打式改革的团体在某些情况下也可能会放松警惕或者被排除在外。如果是这样，美国对将来与中国和印度的合作可能会更加开放。美国是否会以更加有智慧的方式开展此类合作，以弥补其当前方式的缺点，尚有待观察。
[1] 美国学者，以其著作《霸权之后：世界政治经济中的合作与冲突》闻名于国际关系学界，是国际关系学界中新自由制度主义的重要学者，目前在普林斯顿大学的威尔逊学院担任政治科学教授。——译者注
[2] Robert O. Keohane,“The Old IPE and the New,” Review of International Political Economy 16, no. 1 (2009): 34.
[3] Edward D. Mansfield and Diana C. Mutz, “US Versus Them: Mass Attitudes Toward Offshore Outsourcing,” World Politics 65, no. 4 (2013): 571–608.
[4] Brenton D. Peterson, Sonal S. Pandya, and David Leblang, “Doctors with Borders: Occupational Licensing as an Implicit Barrier to High Skill Migration,” Public Choice 160, no. 1–2 ( July 2014): 45–63; Neil Malhotra, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, “Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing Between Prevalence and Conditional Impact,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 2 (April 2013): 391–410; Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, “Individual Attitudes Towards Skilled Migration: An Empirical Analysis Across Countries,” The World Economy 35, no. 2 (2012): 183–96; Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, “Attitudes Toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 61–84; Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew Jon Slaughter, Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, 2001).
[5] Peterson, Pandya, and Leblang, “Doctors with Borders.”
[6] Margaret E. Peters, “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States,” International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014): 811–44.
[7] Ayelet Shachar, “Talent Matters: Immigration Policy-Setting as a Competitive Scramble Among Jurisdictions,” in Wanted and Welcome? Policies for Highly Skilled Immigrants in Comparative Perspective, ed. Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (New York: Springer, 2013), 91.
[8] William Aspray, Frank Mayadas, and Moshe Vardi, “Globalization and Offshoring of Software: A Report of the ACM Job Migration Task Force” (New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2006), 52, www.acm.org/globalizationreport.
[9] 例如，参见Martin Ruhs, The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013)。加里·弗里曼似乎也倾向于这种观点，至少在欧洲国家方面是如此。参见Gary P. Freeman, “National Models, Policy Types, and the Politics of Immigration in Liberal Democracies,” West European Politics 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 237–38。
[10] Shachar, “Talent Matters”; Christiane Kuptsch and Eng Fong Pang, “Introduction,” in Competing for Global Talent, ed. Christiane Kuptsch and Eng Fong Pang (Geneva: Inter- national Labor Office, 2006), 1–8; James F. Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State,” International Migration Review 38, no. 3 (2004): 191.
[11] Georg Menz, The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate Actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Lucie Cerna, “The Varieties of High-Skilled Immigration Policies: Coalitions and Policy Outputs in Advanced Industrial Countries,” Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 1 ( January 2009): 144–61; Alexander A. Caviedes, Prying Open Fortress Europe: The Turn to Sectoral Labor Migration (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); Lucie Cerna,“Attracting High-Skilled Immigrants: Policies in Comparative Perspective,” International Migration 52, no. 3 ( June 2014): 69–84.
[12] Chris F. Wright, “Why Do States Adopt Liberal Immigration Policies? The Policymaking Dynamics of Skilled Visa Reform in Australia,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41, no. 2 ( January 28, 2015): 306–28.
[13] Hollifield, “The Emerging Migration State.”
[14] Linsu Kim, Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 1997); Sean O’Riain, The Politics of High Tech Growth: Developmental Network States in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Dieter Ernst, A New Geography of Knowledge in the Electronics Industry? Asia’s Role in Global Innovation Networks (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 2009); Joseph Wong, Betting on Biotech: Innovation and the Limits of Asia’s Developmental State (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011); Sung-Young Kim, “Transitioning from Fast-Follower to Innovator: The Institutional Foundations of the Korean Telecommunications Sector,” Review of International Political Economy 19, no. 1 (February 2012): 140–68.
[15] Andrew B. Kennedy, “Slouching Tiger, Roaring Dragon: Comparing India and China as Late Innovators,” Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 2 (2016): 1–28.
[16] 这一有关发展中国家的技术民族主义和技术全球主义的文献呈现了这种趋势的部分例外，但这一研究有地域限制，主要集中在东亚，且更关注技术发展，而不是特别关注创新。对于此文献的评论，参见Andrew B. Kennedy, “China’s Search for Renewable Energy: Pragmatic Techno-Nationalism,” Asian Survey 53, no. 5 (2013): 911–13。
[17] Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 217.
[18] Espen Moe, Governance, Growth and Global Leadership: The Role of the State in Technological Progress, 1750–2000 (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2013); Mark Zachary Taylor, The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[19] Michael G. Finn, “Stay Rates of Foreign Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities, 2001” (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, November 2003), 7, http://orise.orau.gov/files/sep/stay-rates-foreign-doctorate-recipients-2001.pdf.
[20] Testimony of Bruce Morrison, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement, March 5, 2013, 4.
[21] Vivek Wadhwa, The Immigrant Exodus: Why America Is Losing the Global Race to Capture Entrepreneurial Talent (Philadelphia: Wharton Digital, 2012), 49.
[22] “Four Ways to Tackle H-1B Visa Reform,” IEEE Spectrum, April 19, 2017.
[23] David Bier, “No One Knows How Long Legal Immigrants Will Have to Wait,” Cato Institute, July 28, 2016, www.cato.org/blog/no-one-knows-how-long-legal-immigrants-will-have-wait.
[24] Andrew B. Kennedy, “Unequal Partners: U.S. Collaboration with China and India in Research and Development,” Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 1 (2017): 63–86.
[25] Lee Branstetter, Guangwei Lee, and Francisco Veloso, “The Rise of International Coinvention,” in The Changing Frontier: Rethinking Science and Innovation Policy, ed. Adam B. Jaffe and Benjamin F. Jones (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 140, 159.
[26] 这一发现归因于几个因素，包括对当地人才的竞争加剧、外国公司保护知识产权的努力、外国和当地公司能力之间的差距，以及外国公司在本国进行核心研发的趋势。参见Xiaolan Fu and Yundan Gong, “Indigenous and Foreign Innovation Efforts and Drivers of Technological Upgrading: Evidence from China,” World Develop- ment 39, no. 7 ( July 2011): 1213–25。
[27] Xiaohong Quan,“Knowledge Diffusion from MNC R&D Labs in Developing Countries: Evidence from Interaction Between MNC R&D Labs and Local Universities in Beijing,” International Journal of Technology Management 51, no. 2 (2010): 364–86.
[28] Anabel Marin and Subash Sasidharan, “Heterogeneous MNC Subsidiaries and Techno- logical Spillovers: Explaining Positive and Negative Effects in India,” Research Policy 39, no. 9 (November 2010): 1227–41.
[29] Kennedy, “Slouching Tiger, Roaring Dragon.”
[30] Mark Foulon and Christopher A. Padilla, “In Pursuit of Security and Prosperity: Technology Controls for a New Era,” Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2007): 88.
[31] Mark Foulon, former acting undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, interviewed by anthor, July 21, 2015.
[32] Christopher A. Padilla, vice-president, Government and Regulatory Affairs, IBM, inter- view by author, March 25, 2016.
[33] 总体来讲，政府与私营部门之间信息共享的潜在障碍是私营部门担心无意中披露政府执法官员可能认为违反美国出口管制规定的行为。为了实现更多的信息共享，美国政府必须找到一种方法，在不放弃出口管制的总体承诺的情况下向公司保证这方面的安全。William Reinsch, President, National Foreign Trade Council, interviewed by author, February 3, 2016.
[34] Vernon M. Briggs, Immigration and American Unionism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Peters, “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States.”
[35] Jennifer Steinhauer, Jonathan Martin, and David M. Herszenhorn, “Paul Ryan Calls Donald Trump’s Attack on Judge ‘Racist,’ but Still Backs Him,” New York Times, June 7, 2016,www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/us/politics/paul-ryan-donald-trump-gonzalo-curiel.html.
[36] Seth Fiegerman, “Silicon Valley Throws Big Money at Clinton and Virtually Nothing at Trump,” CNN, August 23, 2016, http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/23/technology/hillary-clinton-tech-fundraisers/.
[37] Jessica Meyers, “Tech Companies See Few Big Gains in Obama’s Executive Action,” Boston Globe, November 24, 2014, www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/11/24/tech-companies-see-few-big-gains-obama-executive-action/dauDJujkOhe1qx5ZQTScoM/story.html.
[38] Todd Frankel and Tracy Jan, “Trump’s New Travel Ban Raises the Same Silicon Valley Objections,” Washington Post, March 6, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/06/trumps-new-travel-ban-raises-the-same-silicon-valley-objections/.
[39] Rebecca Dickson, “Trump Officials Clamp Down on Worker Visas,” The Hill, April 6, 2017, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/327507-trump-officials-clamp-down-on-worker-visas.
[40] Tony Romm, “How Silicon Valley Is Trying to Topple Trump—Beginning with a Special Election in Montana,” Recode, May 25, 2017, www.recode.net/2017/5/25/15686802/silicon-valley-trump-montana-tech-for-campaigns.
[41] Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Executive Order on Buy American and Hire American,” White House, April 18, 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/18/presidential-executive-order-buy-american-and-hire-american.
[42] Joshua Brustein, “The Secret Way Silicon Valley Uses the H-1B Program,” Bloomberg, June 6, 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-06/silicon-valley-s-h-1b-secret.
[43] Kate Kelly, Rachel Abrams, and Alan Rappeport,“Trump Is Said to Abandon Contentious Border Tax on Imports,” New York Times, April 25, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/us/politics/orrin-hatch-trump-tax-cuts-deficit-economy.html.
[44] “Briefing by Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin and Director of the National Economic Council Gary Cohn,” White House, April 26, 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/26/briefing-secretary-treasury-steven-mnuchin-and-director-national.
[45] Information Technology Industry Council, “ITI on Trump Tax Reform Principles,” Information Technology Industry Council, April 26, 2017, www.itic.org/news-events/news-releases/iti-on-trump-tax-reform-principles; Tony Romm,“Finally, Silicon Valley and Donald Trump Agree on Something: Taxes,” Recode, April 26, 2017, www.recode.net/2017/4/26/15437330/silicon-valley-tech-donald-trump-agree-tax-repatriation-reform.
[46] Joseph G. Paul and Frank Caruso, “One of Trump’s Biggest Plans to Stimulate the Economy Won’t Be Great for Most Americans,” Business Insider, June 1, 2017, www.business insider.com.au/alliancebernstein-on-trump-tax-plan-2017-5?r=US&IR=T.